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Abstract
Lack of collaboration between individual systems and System of Systems (SoS) program management is identified as one of the 
leading problems in SoS engineering. In SoS where individual systems have their own interests, it is necessary to incorporate
mechanisms to persuade individual systems to participate in the SoS development. In this paper an incentive based negotiation 
model is outlined as a mechanism to increase participation of individual systems into the Search and Rescue SoS development.
The model takes into account variations in outcomes due to uncertainty in the acquisition environment as well as contribution of 
each system to overall SoS mission. Different levels of individual system effort and different levels of SoS outcome are identified 
to determine appropriate levels of incentives for individual systems. Study of this application domain provides insights into how 
incentives can be used by decision makers to increase participation in SoS engineering and development.  
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1. Introduction
Ensuring collaboration between individual systems and SoS program management is a challenging issue in 
acknowledged SoS as the SoS management has no control over its constituent systems. Individual systems have 
their own objectives, development approaches and funding.  Besides individual system program managers are 
evaluated based on their effectiveness in keeping their own program on schedule and within budget. On the 
contrary, participating in the SoS development can jeopardize their program as there is possibility of additional cost 
and schedule delays due to SoS change requests13. Thus it is important to address this conflict and consider 
mechanisms to persuade individual systems to participate in the SoS development. 
Several mechanisms are proposed in SoS acquisition literature to increase individual system participation.
Rendon et al.15 identify alternative contracting structures for successful SoS acquisition and study the impacts of 
different contracting structures and organizational structures on SoS acquisition success. Hunynh et al.13 propose a
web-based collaborative system to facilitate collaboration among constituent systems in SoS acquisition. 
Competition and collaboration dynamics are studied to understand autonomy and belonging attributes in SoS of 
swarm robots using multi-attribute utility theory11. While these studies provide valuable insights into successful SoS 
acquisition, they do not directly address the root causes of lack of collaboration including conflict of additional cost 
and schedule delays for individual systems as well as the behavioral characteristics of individual systems such as 
selfishness.
Incentives are used in a wide range of applications including establishing relationships between government and 
contractors in order to improve performance and increase collaboration. This paper outlines an incentive based 
negotiation model to increase participation of individual systems into Search and Rescue SoS. The model provides a 
strategy for SoS management to determine the appropriate amount of incentives necessary to persuade individual 
systems while achieving its own goal. In SoS acquisition, the goal is to acquire a set of individual systems that will 
form the desired meta-architecture. Desired meta-architecture refers to selected set of individual systems and 
interfaces between these systems that will achieve the overarching SoS mission successfully. Generating candidate 
meta-architectures, and evaluating the effectiveness of these meta-architectures is a research area of its own. Thus 
the negotiation model is integrated into the SoS Engineering and Architecting multi-level model referred to as 
Flexible and Intelligent Learning Architectures for SoS (FILA-SoS), where various aspects of the acquisition 
process for Search and Rescue SoS are modelled including SoS meta-architecture generation, evaluation and 
selection as well as behavioral models for individual systems. An overview of the multi-level model is described 
here, detailed description of the SoS model can be found in in Dagli et al.10. Figure 1 illustrates the FILA-SoS 
framework. The framework starts with SoS domain model which identifies the characteristics of the selected 
application domain (See section 3 for a summary of the SAR SoS domain model). Meta-architecture generation 
model generates candidate architectures using the domain model. For example fuzzy-genetic optimization model 
generates candidate meta-architectures in an iterative process. A fuzzy assessor model, based on the domain model, 
evaluates candidate meta-architectures and recommends a desired meta-architecture, which is the input for the 
negotiation between SoS and individual systems. Individual systems utilize different negotiation strategies ranging 
from selfish to collaborative behavior. Selfish systems aim to maximize profits, cooperative systems determines 
cooperation preference for resources and opportunistic systems fluctuate between selfish and cooperative behaviour 
depending on the environment. The FILA-SoS framework assigns different negotiation models to individual 
systems. Once the negotiations are finalized, the fuzzy assessor evaluates the agreed SoS meta-architecture quality 
and moves on to the next acquisition cycle. 
The negotiation model has been applied to another application domain, Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance SoS acquisition case study in Kilicay-Ergin and Dagli16. In that negotiation model, the assumption 
was that SoS management was able to observe the outcomes with certainty. The goal of this paper is to extend the 
negotiation model to include uncertainty in the outcomes and understand key factors necessary for incentive design 
in SoS engineering and development under circumstances where there is variation in outcomes. The rest of the paper 
is organized as following: Section 2 provides literature review on incentive contract design and its relevance for SoS 
engineering. Section 3 provides background information of the application domain, Search and Rescue SoS 
acquisition. Section 4 outlines the incentive based negotiation model. Finally, Section 5 discusses future research 
directions for incentive design for SoS problems.  
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Fig. 1. FILA-SoS Framework [Adapted from16]
2. Incentive Contract Design
Incentives are used in a wide range of applications to promote collaboration and improve system performance. 
This section reviews various SoS domains where incentives are used to improve collaboration. For example, Yang et 
al.4 design incentive mechanisms for mobile phone sensing where smartphones are integrated through a platform to 
sense data about a particular service such as traffic information, WiFi coverage maps, etc. These applications can 
provide good service only if adequate number of users participate and provide sensor information. However, users 
will be interested in participating only if they receive sufficient reward to compensate for the resource consumption 
and security issues that arise due to participating in the SoS. The authors propose two different incentives designs; 
platform centric and user-centric models for determining the appropriate level of incentives for users. In platform 
centric model, a Stackelberg game is designed where platform, the leader, announces its reward and users, the 
followers, determine their sensing time to maximize their own utility. In user-centric model, an auction mechanism 
is designed where the users submit a task-bid pair based on the tasks announced by the platform and the platform 
selects and pays the winning users. 
Zhong et al.1 propose an incentive model for improving participation of selfish nodes in ad-hoc mobile networks 
where a Credit Clearance Service determines the incentives for nodes that transfer messages throughout the network. 
The nodes that receive and deliver messages report to the Credit Clearance Service by sending a receipt of the 
messages. The study focuses on designing a cheat-proof system for selfish nodes that can collaborate with other 
selfish nodes for deceptive actions to maximize their welfare. Yang et al.7 propose a negotiation model to persuade 
selfish nodes to participate in mobile ad-hoc networks where buyers pay a virtual currency for the service and 
negotiation strategy is based on imitating opponent’s behavior. An incentive model is proposed in Tang et al.2 for 
peer-to-peer networks in which incentives are given based on the transaction history of the peer in order to address 
the free-rider problem caused by selfish nodes. While reputation based incentive models provide incentives to 
collaborating nodes, they do not address the possibility of deceptive behavior where selfish nodes collaborate among 
themselves to maximize their welfare. Obreiter and Nimis3 propose taxonomy to classify economic incentive 
patterns in peer-to-peer systems, multi-agent systems, and ad-hoc network systems. According to this taxonomy 
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collective group or by the dynamic behavior of the entities involved in a community. While trust based incentives 
are easy to implement and effective in localized groups, their effectiveness diminishes as the number of entities 
involved increases due to increased possibility of deceptive behavior of entities. Trade based incentives offer a 
service in return for collaboration. The service in return can be reciprocated immediately (barter trade) or promised 
at a later time (bond based). While trade based incentive patterns are effective in terms of scalability, a central 
authority is necessary to ensure a reliable payment process. Osmudsen et al.5 study the use of incentive mechanisms 
in oil service contracts in order to improve drilling efficiency. The study points to unintended consequences in 
drilling industry due to use of incentives. In particular, incentives that reward shorter drilling time jeopardize drilling 
efficiency as well as health, safety and environment. Challenges in designing incentives which fall under agency 
theory are reviewed in detail in Bolton and Dewatripoint6. Acknowledged SoS acquisition falls under the problem 
domain of agency theory where a principal and an agent are engaged in cooperative behavior, but have differing 
goals and differing attitudes toward risk12. In SoS acquisition, the term principal refers to SoS manager acquiring 
services from individual systems to fulfil its mission and the term agent refers to systems providing capabilities 
needed by SoS. The agency theory focuses on finding an effective contract between the principal and the agent by 
considering various factors including self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion, conflicting goals, varying 
levels of outcome and information symmetry. One of the major challenges in incentive design is the information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent where the principal knows less about conducting the services than 
the agent. This can lead to renegotiations which can end up weakening the effectiveness of incentives. Another 
challenge in incentive design is to determine quantitatively measurable performance parameters that can be 
explicitly controlled by the agent. An incentive that addresses all key performance parameters is challenging as 
some measures are qualitative in nature. 
While ad-hoc networks and peer-to-peer networks utilize incentives to promote collaboration, these systems are 
self-organized system of systems. The study of incentives for acknowledged SoS is in its infancy. A fuzzy 
negotiation model is developed in Acheson et al.8 to persuade individual systems to join the SoS development. An 
informal negotiation model is developed based on domain specific knowledge for SoS acquisition in Agarwal et al.9
The focus of this paper is to design incentive mechanisms in negotiations between SoS management and individual 
systems to promote collaboration to fulfill the SoS mission under uncertain acquisition environment.
3. Search and Rescue SoS
In this study a Coast Guard Search and Rescue (SAR) SoS engineering and development problem is selected for 
serving the Alaskan coast. Detailed information about this case study can be found in Dagli et al.10 Here a brief 
description and characteristics of the domain is summarized. There is increasing use of the Bering Sea and the 
Arctic by commercial fisheries, oil exploration and science which increases the likelihood of occurrence of possible 
SAR scenarios.  There is a wide range of scenarios including a sinking ship and the rescue of passengers and/or 
potential exposure of hazardous material (oil), ship stuck in the ice in the Arctic Ocean, oil rig explosion, and 
commercial plane crash. When there is a vessel in distress, the law of the sea requires other mariners to go to its aid. 
The Search and Rescue (SAR) mission aims to minimize loss of life, injury, and property damage or loss at sea by 
finding and providing aid to those in distress. The Coast Guard has numerous systems with differing capabilities 
such as cutters, aircraft, helicopters, communication systems, and control centers available from several stations in 
the area. In addition, fishing vessels, civilian craft, and commercial vessels join in an ad hoc SoS to provide 
assistance when a disaster strikes.  A sample SAR SoS with 29 systems of 9 types, with 10 different capabilities, 
with as many as 9 capabilities per system is planned for the SoS development. Table 1 summarizes the overarching 
SoS capability as well as the capabilities necessary for the overarching SAR SoS capability.
Measures of effectiveness for SAR SoS, factors that might limit its effectiveness as well as factors that might 
increase its effectiveness and other attributes for evaluating the overall SoS are identified through discussions with 
subject matter experts. Estimation of the costs for developing interfaces to each system, and cost for operating the 
system for three days are also determined using values in informal budgetary estimates for interfacing with 
communication systems and integrating mission systems. The deadline for development of an interface is estimated 
based on the end of an epoch which is equal to one acquisition cycle. If the deadline value is 0, the interface is ready 
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to be deployed, if the value is 1, interface will be ready by the end of the epoch, and if the value is 2, the interface 
will not be ready this epoch but the next epoch.
Table 1. Overarching SoS capability and contributing system capabilities




Emergency Locator Beacon System
RF direction finder
Deliver Paramedic/medical aid
Remove survivor(s) to Emergency Medical Care





1. Maritime Search & 
Rescue (SAR) of Bering 
Sea small airliner crash at 
sea
2. Stranded Cruise Ship in 
Other Territorial Waters
3. Find two people in a small 
boat in distress
A summary of the key characteristics of the SAR SoS domain can be found in Table 2.  These characteristics 
help to identify the operational SAR context for which optimal SoS meta-architecture can be determined given the 
mission parameters and tradeoffs among SoS attributes including performance, flexibility, robustness and 
affordability.
Table 2. Characteristics of a SAR SoS [adapted from10]
SoS Measures of 
Effectiveness
Time to search 100,000 Sq Mi
Probability of detection of survivors within 2 hours/within 12 hours
Development Budget $15M
Operations Budget $10M (operation for 3 days)
Table 3 provides a sample of the candidate individual systems for SAR SoS architecture as well as estimation of its 
relative performance range based on its key capability, development cost of interfaces required from the system in 
order to be in the SoS architecture and operational cost of system within the SoS for the duration of three days.
Table 3. Individual system performance and cost estimations
System Type Performance Development Cost Operation Cost
Helicopter 20-40 0.1 2
Fish vessel 4-24 0.03 0.5
Coordination center 5-25 0.05 0.5
Communication 1-21 0.02 0.03
4. Incentive based Negotiation Model
In SoS acquisition, there is uncertainty in terms of outcomes during the integration of various independent 
systems. In particular, there could be several outcomes depending on the effort level of individual systems as well as 
external factors. Effort level refers to the amount of resources allocated by the individual system to the development 
of the SoS request. For example, individual system may allocate high level effort but due to external factors such as 
changes in systems involved or bad weather conditions, the outcome may end up to be equivalent to an outcome 
when low level effort is selected. Thus, considering and providing incentives based only on the outcome may not be 
attractive to the individual systems as the outcome may not indicate the true effort level of the individual systems in 
uncertain environments. The incentive negotiation model proposed in this paper extends the incentive contracting 
framework in Kilicay-Ergin16 to take into account uncertainty in the acquisition environment. 
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In this model, rather than negotiating for a target performance value, the SoS manager negotiates a performance 
range with the individual systems considering their contribution to the SoS mission. The incentive contract is 
designed based on the objectives of the SoS and the individual systems. Individual system’s objective is to secure 
highest incentives with minimal effort while the SoS manager’s goal is to convince individual systems to join the 
SoS development while maximizing its own utility. In this contracting scheme, individual systems may accept the 
contract but will choose the effort level later. This gives individual systems the advantage of gaining more 
information about the environment state during or after the development of the SoS request. Determining the 
incentives for individual systems can be formulated as a multi-constraint problem where SoS manager selects a 
reward for the individual system such that the reward will maximize SoS manager’s expected utility while satisfying 
the constraints of the individual systems14.
Maximize ݎଵ, … . , ݎ௡ σ Ե( Ƹ݁௡௜ୀଵ , ݍ௜)ܷௌ௢ௌ(ݍ௜ , ݎ௜) (1)
with the constraints:
1. σ Ե( Ƹ݁௡௜ୀଵ , ݍ௜)ܷ௜௦( Ƹ݁ , ݎ௜) ൒ ݑො (2)
2. Ƹ݁ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௘אா௙௙௢௥௧ σ Ե(݁, ݍ௜)ܷ௜௦௡௜ୀଵ (݁, ݎ௜) (3)
whereܷௌ௢ௌ(ݍ௜ , ݎ௜) denotes SoS manager’s utility function which is a function of outcome(ݍ௜ ), and reward(ݎ௜ ). 
Possible set of rewards/incentives given to the individual systems ݎଵ, ݎଶ… , ݎ௜depend on the outcomes, ݍଵ, ݍଶ… , ݍ௜ .
Since there is uncertainty about the acquisition environment and both parties do not know the outcome, probability 
function Ե is used for different outcome states. Individual system outcome depends on the set of effort levels of the 
individual system which is denoted as ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ… , ݁௜. Two constraints capture the individual system perspective. The 
first constraint ensures that incentive for the individual system is sufficient enough to motivate the individual system 
to accept the contract. This means that expected utility of the individual system, ܷ௜௦( Ƹ݁, ݎ௜) should be greater than its 
reservation price, ݑො . Otherwise individual system will shift its resources to other activities such as maintenance or its 
own development and operation. The second constraint ensures that the individual system selects the SoS’s 
preferred effort level; denoted as Ƹ݁ . Incentives help to align differing goals of SoS and individual systems and 
maximize the welfare of both parties.  
4.1 SoS utility
In the FILA-SoS framework, a desired meta-architecture is selected using the fuzzy-genetic architecture selection 
model. The meta-architecture contains information on interface requirements to other systems. SoS manager’s goal 
is to acquire the individual systems selected in the desired meta-architecture. Since effective incentive design 
depends on metrics that can be directly measured by the contractor, negotiations between the individual system and 
SoS manager should be done at the local level but SoS manager should consider the impact of local performance on 
the overall SoS mission. Individual systems that make a major contribution to the SoS mission are more critical so
this should be reflected in SoS utility function for the individual system. Degree centrality is one of the measures in 
a network that can be used to determine the most important nodes in SoS architecture. Freeman’s general formula 
for centralization can be used to determine the individual system’s relevance for the overall SoS architecture.





where ܥ஽(ݒ௞) is the degree centrality of a vertex in a network, n is the number of nodes in the network, and 
ܽ(ݒ௜ , ݒ௞) is the tie a vertex has with other vertices in a network. While this measure is the simplest form of 
determining the impact of nodes on the overall network, it provides a basic structure to form a link between local 
individual system performances to global SoS performance. 
SAR SoS mission is to detect survivors within 2-12hours where shorter time for detection of survivors is more 
desirable. From monetary outcomes shorter detection times will result in operational cost savings. Since operational 
cost is estimated to be $10M, the best performance, detection time of survivors in 2 hours, will result in
approximately $9.7M cost savings while a lower performance, detection time of survivors in 12 hours, will result in 
approximately $8.3M cost savings for SoS. In this model, the assumption is that systems with higher degree 
centrality have more impact on the overall SoS mission success. Performance expectations for individual systems 
are estimated by subject matter experts and are included in the domain model (see Table 3 for a sample of the 
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estimated performance values for individual systems). SoS manager estimates the individual system performance to 
be in the range of (ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௔௫ െ ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௜௡). If individual system selects a low effort level, then the probability 
that it will result in max performance, ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௔௫ is 1/3 and the probability that it will result in ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௜௡ is 
2/3. However, if individual system selects a high effort level, then the probability that it will result in ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௔௫ is 
3/4 and the probability that it will result in ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௜௡is 1/4. If individual system performs within ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௔௫ it
is worth 9.7 for the SoS and if it performs withinݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௔௫ it is worth 8.3 for the SoS. In that case SoS utility 
functions for two different outcome states can be expressed as: 
ܷௌ௢ௌ൫ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௜௡ , ݎ൯ = 8.3ܥ஽(ݒ௞)െ ݎ (5)
ܷௌ௢ௌ൫ݏݕݏݐ݁݉௣௠௔௫ , ݎ൯ = 9.7ܥ஽(ݒ௞)െ ݎ (6)
4.2 Individual system utility 
Individual system’s utility is to maximize the benefits from being involved in the SoS development. This can be 
expressed in terms of incentives gained by being involved in the SoS and the resources used for the SoS request.
The development cost for individual system is estimated by the SoS (see Table 3). The following function (7) 
captures this relationship:
ܷ௦(ݎ, ݁) = ݎ െ (ܿௗ௘௩ × ݁) (7)
where r stands for reward/incentive,  ܿௗ௘௩ stands for development cost for the individual system to join the SoS, and 
e stands for effort level. 
Critical threshold for individual system to accept the SoS offer depends on the estimation of the reservation price for 
the individual system. If incentives are lower than the reservation price, individual system shifts its resources to 
other activities important for itself such as maintenance or its own operation. For the SAR SoS case study, 
reservation price for individual systems are determined by estimating the maintenance costs of individual systems. 
For example approximately 35% of operational cost for helicopters is allocated for maintenance. The following 
notation indicates estimation of reservation price to be equal to maintenance cost.
ݑො = ܿ௠௔௜௡௧ (8)
4.3 Effort level
Effort level refers to the resources allocated for developing the interfaces requested by the SoS. In this model, two 
levels of effort are identified; low effort level and high effort level. In reality, the range of effort levels will be more
granular. Different levels of effort are expressed in the following equations:
݁௟௢௪ = 1, and  ݁௛௜௚௛ = 2 (9)
4.4 Negotiation strategy for SoS
Once the utility functions for SoS and individual systems are determined, appropriate amount of incentives can 
be calculated using the maximization equation 1 and the constraints expressed in equations 2 and 3. Since there is 
uncertainty in outcomes, the maximization problem can be solved by using linear programming with the assumption 
that both parties are risk neutral. Since there are two effort levels, maximization problem for the SAR SoS case 
study can be solved using the following equations 10-12. Using equations 5 and 6, two levels are incentives are 
derived in equation 10.
ݎଵ = 8.3ܥௗ(ݒ௞)ܷௌ௢ௌ , ܽ݊݀ ݎଶ = 9.7ܥௗ(ݒ௞)ܷௌ௢ௌ (10)
Individual system utility should be greater than its reservation price for low and high level of effort. Equation 11 and 
12 express that constraint. Finally substituting equations (10) into (11) and (12), effort level that maximizes ܷௌ௢ௌis 
found.
1. ܹ݄݁݊ ݁ = 1: ଶ
ଷ
(ݎଵ െ ܿௗ௘௩) + ଵଷ (ݎଶ െ ܿௗ௘௩) ൒ ܿ௠௔௜௡௧ (11)
2. ܹ݄݁݊ ݁ = 2: ଵ
ସ
(ݎଵ െ 2ܿௗ௘௩) + ଷସ (ݎଶ െ 2ܿௗ௘௩) ൒ ܿ௠௔௜௡௧ (12)
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5. Future Research
In this paper, an incentive model is proposed as a mechanism to improve collaboration for SAR SoS acquisition. 
The model takes into account uncertainty in outcomes due to external environment and determines probabilities of 
possible outcome states in order to allocate the appropriate incentives for individual systems. In this model, the 
parties negotiate for a benchmark performance range where higher incentives are proposed for better outcomes. 
Individual systems can determine the level of effort at a later time when they have more information about the 
acquisition environment which makes the contract attractive for the individual systems. The benchmark performance 
range can be adjusted in later phases of the acquisition cycle depending on the changes in the external environment. 
However, the adjustment of performance ranges can result in renegotiations which can weaken the effect of 
incentives. Future studies will focus on integration of the incentive model to FILA-SoS framework to understand the 
effect of the model on different behavioral settings such as selfish and cooperative behavior. The simulation studies 
will also look into the effectiveness of the incentive scheme under multiple cycles of the acquisition process to 
understand proper timing of using incentives in SoS acquisition.  
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